Abstract-We consider the problem of identification and authentication based on secret key generation from some usergenerated source data (e.g., a biometric source). The goal is to reliably identify users pre-enrolled in a database as well as authenticate them based on the estimated secret key while preserving the privacy of the enrolled data and of the generated keys. We characterize the optimal tradeoff region of the identification rate, compression rate of the users' source data, information leakage rate, and secret key rate. In particular, we provide a coding strategy based on layered random binning which is shown to be optimal. In addition, we study a related secure identification/authentication problem where an adversary tries to deceive the system using its own data. Here, the optimal tradeoff of the identification rate, compression rate, leakage rate, and exponent of the maximum false acceptance probability is provided. The results reveal a close connection between the optimal secret key rate and the false acceptance exponent of the identification/authentication system. Index Terms-Biometric security, information theoretic security, secret key, information leakage, false acceptance probability.
I. INTRODUCTION

C
ONSIDER an identification and authentication system with K users (see Fig. 1 ). In the enrollment phase, each user k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , K } generates a source sequence X n (k) and provides it to the system. Such source sequences are compressed intoM {M(k) : k = 1, . . . , K } and stored into a database. The compressed user source data (also called helper data) will be used as a reference for identification of the enrolled users. At the same time, the system produces a set of secret keys {S(k) : k = 1, . . . , K }, also functions of the users' source sequences, which will be used as a reference for authentication of the identified user. In the identification/authentication phase, an arbitrary user w ∈ {1, . . . , K } whose identity is unknown to the system, provides a measurement Y n . For example, this could be seen as a noisy version of its enrolled source sequence X n (w). Based on the stored databaseM and measurement Y n , the user is identified asŴ . The system also produces an estimated keyŜ. The user is successfully identified and authenticated if (Ŵ ,Ŝ) = (w, S(w)). The system described above can be relevant in several applications including those involving access control, secure, and trustworthy communication. In database identification for access control applications, the system identifies an individual as an enrolled user and then grants the corresponding access based on authentication using the secret-key. In other words, the system first finds the most likely user in its database given the observed sequence Y n , and then verifies whether the individual is really the user he/she claims to be by matching the corresponding secret key.
One important class of access control applications is related to using biometric data such as fingerprint, iris scans, voice, face, and DNA sequences (see, e.g., [1] and references therein). Unlike passwords, the biometric data inherently belong to the users and provide a convenient and seemingly more secure way for identification/authentication. However, it is crucial that the privacy of the enrolled data must be protected from any inference of an adversary. The privacy risk in this case is of potentially high impact since the biometric data is typically tied to the person identity. If it is compromised, it cannot be reverted or changed easily, unlike in the case of a password.
In this work, we consider secret-key based identification and authentication problems in the presence of an adversary which is not part of the system but has full knowledge of the stored database of helper dataM as well as to some "online" side information Z n , as shown in Fig. 1 . We refer to Z n as on-line side information since it is statistically dependent on the source sequence X n (w) of the actual user w which is trying to be identified and authenticated, as shown in Fig. 1 . In contrast, the knowledge ofM can be regarded as "offline" side information for the adversary since the database is created beforehand, at the time of enrollment.
We consider a scenario where the adversary is passive and is interested in inferring the user's source sequence. In this case, we wish to design a reliable identification/authentication system that achieves maximal identification rate and secret key rate (see definitions in Section II-A) while minimizing the compression rate of the stored descriptions and the information leakage rate of the enrolled source sequences. In general, there exists tension between these performance metrics. Our main contribution is a single-letter characterization of the optimal tradeoff region of the identification rate, compression rate, Fig. 1 . Identification and secret key-based authentication system with an adversary. The enrollment phase is performed in the big box where the encoder enc generates separately a pair of secret key and helper data (S(k), M(k)) as output of each individual sequence X n (k), k = 1, . . . , K . The helper dataM is assumed to be publicly stored in a database while the secret keys are stored securely. The remaining part corresponds to the identification/authentication phase where an arbitrary user w is presented to the system. The dashed arrow corresponds to an active adversary which replaces the original user measurement Y n with its own generated signalỹ n (M, Z n ) in order to gain access to the system. information leakage rate, and key rate for discrete memoryless sources.
In addition, we discuss a closely related scenario where the adversary is active and tries to deceive the identification/authentication system by using its own sequencẽ Y n =ỹ n (M, Z n ). We refer to the event where the legitimate user fails during identification/authentication as a false rejection, and to the event where the system accepts the adversary as a false acceptance. In this case, we wish to design a secure identification/authentication system that achieves arbitrarily small false rejection probability with maximum identification rate and: i) minimizes the compression rate of each stored description, ii) minimizes the leakage rate of each enrolled sources, and iii) maximizes the error exponent of the maximum false acceptance probability (mFAP).
In order to motivate the role of key-based authentication to the possibly unfamiliar readers, we use the following naive everyday-life example. Consider the front door of a building equipped with an intercom device with multiple buttons. Each button corresponds to an apartment in the building. An intruder may wish to gain access to the building by hitting at random a button, hoping that the people inside the corresponding apartment just open the door, by identifying the intruder as friend/family just because he/she hit their button. Instead, if the intercom is also equipped with a camera and a facial recognition software, the door will be opened only if the intruder face (properly projected into some feature space) generates a hashing function value that matches with the key corresponding to that apartment. Technically speaking, the optimal identification problem corresponds to K -ary hypothesis testing, which just provides the answer minimizing the average probability of wrong identification. However, the identified user needs also to be authenticated (in this case, by showing his/her face) in order to rightfully gain access to the system.
A. Related Work
Authentication problems have been studied from an information theoretic perspective in several directions. Maurer in [2] considered the message authentication problem in connection with the hypothesis testing problem where the underlying message probability distributions of the legitimate user and adversary are assumed to be different. Martinian et al. [3] considered authentication with a distortion criterion. More recently, some works have considered authentication based on secret key generation [4] which are closely related to fuzzy extractor [5] . These include, for example, Lai et al., and Ignatenko and Willems [6] - [10] , which focused on biometric authentication systems [11] where privacy of the enrolled data is also taken into account. In [12] , we considered a general case where the adversary has correlated side information and we provided a complete characterization of the fundamental tradeoff. Analysis of deception probability in authentication systems from an adversary's perspective was also considered in [13] . Closely related to the secret key-based authentication problem with privacy constraint are the problems of source coding with privacy constraint, e.g., [14] , [15] , where the goals are to reconstruct the source reliably while preserving the privacy of the source or the reconstruction sequences from the inference of an eavesdropper.
By extending the single-user authentication problem to the identification/authentication problem in the multi-user case, another dimension is added into the problem, namely we also care for the identification rate. A database identification problem for biometric data was considered in [16] and [17] where the noisy measurement of all user data are treated as a database and the maximum identification rate was characterized. Later, Tuncel [18] considered the problem where the database is a compressed version of the user data and showed the optimal tradeoff between identification rate and compression rate. Recently, this was extended to include also a lossy reconstruction constraint at the decoder [19] . Ignatenko and Willems [20] , [21] studied the problem of user identification together with secret key-based authentication under a privacy constraint, extending the secret-key based authentication problem to the multi-user setting.
B. Contribution and Organization
In this work we extend the setting of [20] and [21] to a more general case, including a compression rate constraint on the source description and allowing the adversary to have access to correlated side information. The setting of this paper can also be viewed as a multi-user extension of our previous work [12] . Correlated side information at the adversary, as treated here, is of practical interest since it models scenarios where the adversary can have access to noisy version of the source data. 1 The main contributions of this work are summarized in the following.
• For the passive adversary case, we provide a complete characterization of the optimal identificationcompression-leakage-keyrate region for discrete memoryless sources in Theorem 1. The result recovers several existing ones in the literature including the authentication problem studied in [12] .
• The achievability proof is based on a layered binning scheme with a novel rate allocation argument between compression and identification rates applied only on the first layer helper data. This is shown to be optimal by proving a matching converse outer bound.
• For the case of active adversary, we provide a complete characterization of the optimal identificationcompression-leakage-mFAP exponent region for discrete memoryless sources in Theorem 2.
• The rate regions for passive and active adversary cases in Theorems 1 and 2 have the same form, revealing a close connection between the optimal secret key rate and security of identification/authentication system which can be insightful for designing the practical systems. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we study the problem of secret key-based identification and authentication with a privacy constraint and provide the optimal identification-compression-leakage-keyrate region. Several related results are discussed and binary examples illustrating the derived tradeoffs are also provided. Moreover, we consider the case of active adversary and provide a complete characterization of the identification-compressionleakage-mFAP exponent region. In Section III, we provide the proof of the main result. Finally, Section IV concludes the work.
C. Notation
We denote discrete random variables, their corresponding realizations or deterministic values, and their alphabets by the upper case, lower case, and calligraphic letters, respectively. X n m denotes the sequence {X m , . . . , X n } when m ≤ n, and the empty set otherwise. Also, we use the shorthand notation X n for X Let us consider a secret key-based identification and authentication system as shown in Fig. 1 . Source, measurement and side information alphabets, X , Y, Z are finite sets. The users' source sequences
W (n) are independent across the users and have i.i.d. components distributed according to some fixed source distribution P X . In the enrollment phase, an encoder generates a description M(k), also known as helper data, and a secret key S(k) both based on X n (k), for each k ∈ W (n) . The helper data are stored in a database for later identification and authentication. In the identification/authentication phase, an arbitrary unknown user w ∈ W (n) presents itself to the system and generates a measurement sequence Y n jointly distributed with X n (w). Based on the observation of Y n and on the stored databaseM
, a decoder identifies the user asŴ and generates an estimate of its keyŜ.
The identification and authentication operation is successful if (Ŵ ,Ŝ) = (w, S(w)).
We introduce the formal definition of a coding scheme in the following.
-code for secret key-based identification and authentication with a privacy constraint consists of
♦ In this work we consider an adversary which has access to the whole databaseM and to a side information sequence Z n also jointly distributed with X n (w). We assume that (X n (w), Y n , Z n ) are memoryless (with respect to the sequence index i ) with the i -th marginal joint distribution P X,Y,Z = P X P Y,Z |X , where P Y,Z |X is a given transition probability distribution of a discrete memoryless broadcast channel (see Fig. 1 ). In contrast, for all k = w, the triples (X n (k), Y n , Z n ) are memoryless with the i -th marginal distribution P X P Y,Z , where P Y,Z is the YZ-marginal distribution of P X,Y,Z .
The properties of multiletter joint probability distribution underlying our problem are summarized below.
• The distribution
expressing the fact that the user source sequences are mutually independent and that the helper data and secrete key of user k are generated solely from the source sequence of user k.
, expressing the fact that the user source sequences are i.i.d.
• Let w ∈ W (n) denote the index of the user presented to the system for identification/authentication. Then, the user measurement sequence and the adversary side information sequence are jointly distributed with
where the notation P (w) is to emphasize the dependence of w. We note that w plays the role of a "compound" index, in the sense that (1) and (2) define a family of multiletter joint distributions P = {P w : w ∈ W (n) }. We wish to characterize the optimal tradeoff region of the identification rate, compression rate, information leakage rate, and secret key rate, achievable by a single coding scheme that must work for all such distributions, i.e., for all P w ∈ P. As in the classical compound channel formulation, the code must be constructed a priori, i.e., without the knowledge of w. In our problem we have also that the enrollment phase is done a priori, without knowledge of w.
In order to reflect the above compound formulation, we use P w (·), I w (·) and H w (·) to indicate the probability measure, and corresponding mutual information and entropy, when the joint distribution is P w ∈ P defined by (1) and (2) . The information leakage rate of user w at the adversary is measured by the mutual information rate I w (X n (w);M, Z n )/n. Similarly, the key leakage rate of user w at the adversary is measured by the mutual information rate I w (S(w);M, Z n )/n. 2 We introduce the formal definition of achievability in the following.
Definition 2:
+ is said to be achievable if, for any δ > 0 there exists a sequence of
max
min
The identification-compression-leakage-keyrate region R is then defined as the closure of all achievable tuples. ♦
B. Results
Theorem 1:
The region R for the identification/ authentication problem defined above is given by a set of all tuples
for some P X,Y,Z P V |X P U |V . Furthermore, in order to generate the region R it is sufficient to consider auxiliary variables U, V with H (U |V ) = 0, defined on alphabets satisfying the cardinality bounds |U| ≤ |X | + 4, |V| ≤ (|X | + 4) (|X | + 2). By standard time-sharing argument [25] , it is immediate to show that R is convex.
The proof of Theorem 1 is given in Section III where the achievability part is based on a random coding argument together with the layered random binning scheme while the converse part is based on standard properties of the entropy function.
The set of joint distributions associated with Theorem 1 implies the Markov chain U − V − X − (Y, Z ). We note that this Markov chain is assumed in the achievability proof when constructing the random coding ensemble, and its sufficiency for the whole region R is a consequence of the converse proof. Also, the sufficiency of the additional restriction H (U |V ) = 0 emerges form the converse proof. It is also possible to see this directly from the expression of R in Theorem 1. It is in fact possible to rewrite the inequalities in (4b)-(4d) such that whenever random variable V appears, it appears together with U . Then we can see that relaxing the set of distributions to the class (U, V ) − X − (Y, Z ) does not change the region. 
This is because
Before giving the proof of Theorem 1, some remarks are in order.
Remark 1 (Interpretation of Layered Coding Scheme):
The bounds (4c) and (4d) in Theorem 1 can be rewritten as
To maximize R S and minimize R L , we wish to minimize the term I (Y ; U ) − I (Z ; U ). As noted also in [14] , the minimum
This implies that the adversary who knows Z n and databaseM can also decode the codeword U n reliably. We may then view the optimal layered coding scheme as consisting of public and private codeword layers U n and V n , designed in such a way that maximizes the key rate without revealing much information to the adversary.
Remark 2 (Layered Random Binning):
Binning usually helps to reduce the rate needed for compression. In the related identification problem [19] the authors showed that the binning scheme is optimal when an additional reconstruction constraint is included. As we shall see in the proof of Theorem 1, layered binning also turns out to be optimal in the presence of an information leakage constraint towards an adversary with access to correlated side information. Interestingly, we note that the obtained tradeoff between compression and identification rates in (4b) results from the rate allocation which is applied only on the first layer codeword.
Remark 3 (Special Cases): Theorem 1 recovers results of several special cases in the literature. i) When there is only one user in the database, i.e., |W (n) | = 1, the problem reduces to authentication with a privacy constraint studied in [12] (see e.g., Fig. 2 ). It can also be viewed as an extension of the secret key agreement problem with one-way communication constraint [26] to include an information leakage constraint. By setting R I = 0 in R, we obtain the compression-leakage-keyrate region consisting
for some joint distributions of the form
. ii) When restricting to the case without secret key-based authentication (R S = 0), the problem reduces to identification with a privacy constraint. By setting V = U in R, we obtain the identification-compression-leakage rate region consisting of all tuples
for some joint distributions of the form P X,Y,Z P U |X . Furthermore, without the leakage constraint, this result recovers the optimal compression-identification rate (capacity/storage) tradeoff in [18] , [19] . iii) When there is no compression rate constraint (i.e., R C = H (X)) and, furthermore, the adversary has no "on-line" side information (i.e., Z = ∅), the region reduces to the set of all tuples (R I , R L , R S ) ∈ R 3 + such that
for some joint distributions of the form P X,Y P V |X P U |V . By setting I (Y ; U ) = R I in the expression above and thus relaxing the constraints further, we show that the above region is included in the region given in [21, Th. 1] . To show that the two regions are in fact equivalent, we can consider the corner points of the region in [21, Th. 1] and show that they all lie in our region above.
C. Binary Example
To demonstrate the derived tradeoff in Theorem 1, we consider simple binary examples of the special cases in Remark 3-i) and ii). In the first two examples, we consider the case where the Markov chain X − Y − Z holds, i.e., X ∼ Bernoulli(1/2), Y is an erased version of X with erasure probability p, and Z is an erased version of Y with erasure probability q.
1) When there is no identification rate constraint, the region
for some α ∈ [0, 1/2], where h(·) is the binary entropy function. The proof is given in Appendix B where setting U = ∅ in Remark 3-i) is optimal. We can see for example the tradeoff between secret key rate and leakage rate, i.e., to achieve a high secret key rate, we need to operate at a high compression rate and also allow high amount of information leakage. 2) When there is no key rate constraint, the region
for some α ∈ [0, 1/2]. The proof follows similarly as that of R i,X −Y −Z and is therefore omitted. We can see a similar tradeoff between identification rate and leakage rate, i.e., to achieve a high identification rate, we pay the cost of having high amount of information leakage. In above examples, side information at the adversary is assumed to be degraded with respect to that at the legitimate decoder. This allows us to obtain the optimal region which is achieved by the degenerate scheme by setting U = ∅ or U = V . In general, the layered coding scheme can outperform the degenerate ones. To illustrate such cases, we consider another example below for which side information Y and Z are not always in a degraded form.
3) Consider the case where there is no identification rate constraint. Let X ∼ Bernoulli(1/2), Y is an erased version of X with erasure probability , and Z is an output of a binary symmetric channel (BSC) with input X and crossover probability p. We note that the values of p and determine the structure of side information. If p and are such that 4
, we have that Y is more capable, but not less noisy than Z [14] , [28] . The following achievable region is obtained from Remark 3-i) by choosing V to be an output of a BSC with input X and crossover α, and choosing U to be an output of a BSC with input V and crossover β:
In Fig. 3 , we plot the maximum achievable key rate R S as a function of R L for some fixed R C based on the achievable region above. We see that by allowing higher leakage rate, one can achieve higher key rate in general. However, there is a saturation point for which one cannot improve the key rate further due to the constraint on R C . To see the benefit of layered coding scheme, we compare the maximum achievable key rate R S with the one obtained from the single layer scheme with U = ∅ for the case R C = 0.3 and see that the maximum achievable key rate R S obtained from the two-layer scheme is strictly higher. It is also interesting to see how the rate R C are "allocated" across the two code layers U and V , i.e., R C,U = I (X; U |Y ) and R C,V = I (X; V |U, Y ). In the plot, we include the tuples (R C,U , R C,V ) to indicate the rate allocation corresponding to each tradeoff curve when the constraint on R C becomes active (i.e., at a high leakage R L regime). We see that among different curves, the rate R C,U remains roughly constant while R C,V increases with R S . This might be argued that the rate of codeword layer U is limited by the information leakage constraint (at the saturation point) such that more bits are allocated to the private codeword layer V when we are required to transmit at a higher rate (cf. the interpretation of optimal layered coding scheme in Remark 1).
D. Active Adversary Attack
In this section, we consider a new problem which is operationally different from the one in Section II-A. Here the adversary is assumed to be active and tries to deceive the identification/authentication system using its own data. We now consider a constraint on the false acceptance probability instead of constraints on the secret key rate and key leakage.
The enrollment and identification/authentication phases follow similarly as in Section II-A. In the event of an attack, the adversary presents to the decoder its own sequencẽ y n ∈ Y n generated as a function ofM and Z n , in order to gain access to the system. The adversary will first be identified as one of the users according to the decoding function g Au (M,ỹ n ) which will then be compared with the original key of the user whom it is identified to be, e.g., S(g
Id (M,ỹ n )). We define the false acceptance event as {g
Id (M,ỹ n ))}. Operationally, it means that the adversary gains access as if it were user g (n)
The maximum false acceptance probability (mFAP) is
Id (M,ỹ n ))). 3 Since the adversary will be identified as one of the users in the database, we are concerned about whether it will also be positively authenticated and therefore wish to minimize the maximum false acceptance probability exponentially, i.e., to maximize the exponent E such that
for any small δ. We are interested in characterizing the optimal tradeoff region of the identification rate, compression rate, information leakage rate, and mFAP exponent, where the achievability of the 4-tuple (R I , R C , R L , E) is defined as in Definition 2, with (3e) and (3f) replaced by (5). We have Theorem 2: The identification-compression-leakage-mFAP exponent region R act for the identification/authentication problem under active adversary is given by a set of all tuples
for some P X,Y,Z P V |X P U |V . Furthermore, in order to generate the region R act it is sufficient to consider auxiliary variables U , V with H (U |V ) = 0, defined on alphabets satisfying the cardinality bounds |U| ≤ |X | + 4, |V| ≤ (|X | + 4) (|X | + 2). For completeness, a formal statement of the problem described above and the proof of Theorem 2 are provided in Appendix C.
Remark 4: The regions R and R act specified in Theorems 1 and 2 have the same form. In particular, 3 We note that the maximization maxỹn (M,Z n ) here is over the functions y n (·), not over the sequences in Y n .
the maximum mFAP exponent in Theorem 2 is equivalent to the maximum achievable secret key rate in Theorem 1. This reveals a connection between the achievable secret key rate and the security of identification/authentication system measured in terms of adversary's false acceptance probability.
Intuitively, the equivalence follows from the fact that the achievable scheme used to prove Theorem 1 can also be applied to Theorem 2. Achievable identification rate, compression rate, and leakage rate are therefore the same. Let the scheme used in Theorem 1 with achievable key rate R S satisfy 1 n H w (S(w)) ≥ R S − δ
for each w ∈ W (n) . Since the scheme utilizes uniform bin and sub-bin index assignment, and the secret key is chosen as a sub-bin index of the selected codeword, the adversary who observesm and z n effectively does not obtain any useful knowledge about the secret key. Then, all what the adversary can do is to choose a key at random, such that the mFAP is upperbounded by 2 −n(R S −δ ) , implying that the key rate R S is also an achievable mFAP exponent. We note that the same observation holds true when specializing to the single user case [12] . This is also noted in [10] for the case without adversary's side information.
III. PROOF OF THEOREM 1
In this section, we provide the proof of Theorem 1. The achievability part is based on a random coding argument where we use the definitions and properties of -typicality as in [23] , while in converse, we use properties of the entropy function together with the joint PMF associated with the problem formulation.
A. Achievability
Our achievable scheme utilizes layered coding, binning, and sub-binning as illustrated in Fig. 4 . The intuition behind the coding scheme is as follows. We use two layers of codewords {U n } and {V n } in order to adapt to the presence of an adversary by controlling the amount of information leakage via the description M. Since the decoder has access to side information Y n , binning is used to reduce the compression rate at each layer. This also essentially reduces the information leakage rate. Moreover, to generate a secret key, we divide the second layer bin into sub-bins in order to prevent the key leakage. We note that the availability of side information Z n at the adversary has an impact on the structure of the achievable scheme. For example, if Z n becomes degenerate, e.g., Z = ∅, then it can be shown that the second layer of codewords and sub-binning are not required to achieve the optimal identification-compression-leakage-keyrate region.
We fix P V |X and P U |V . Let and δ be positive real numbers where δ → 0 as → 0. Assume that 
1) Codebook Generation:
Randomly and independently generate codewords u n ( j ) for j ∈ [1 : 2 n(I (X ;U )+δ ) ], according to the product distribution n i=1 P U (u i ). Choosing some identification rate
we distribute the codewords uniformly at random into 2) Enrollment:
For each user k ∈ W (n) , given X n (k) = x n (k), the encoder looks for u n ( j ) that is jointly typical with x n (k) and then for v n ( j, l) that is jointly typical with (x n (k), u n ( j ) ). From the covering lemma [23] , with high probability, there exist such codeword pairs since there are more than 2 nI (X ;U ) codewords u n ( j ) and, for each j , there are more than 2 nI (X ;V |U ) codewords v n ( j, l). If there are more than one such pairs, the encoder selects one of them uniformly at random. Let the chosen codeword indices of user k be denoted by s (k) ). The encoder stores the corresponding bin indices m 1 (k) and m 2 (k) into the database as the stored description of user k. The compression rate of each user is thus given by
where the second equality follows from the chain rule
The secret key corresponding to user k is given by the subbin index s(k) in which the chosen sequence
3) Identification/Authentication: Let an arbitrary user w ∈ W (n) be presented to the system, and let y n denote the realization of the corresponding measurement sequence (m 2 (1) , . . . , m 2 (K ))) and observes y n . Then, for each k ∈ W (n) , it looks into the corresponding bins b U (m 1 (k)) and b V (m 1 (k), m , m 2 (k) ) for all indices m and checks if there exists a codeword pair
jointly typical with y n for some m , s, s . Suppose that there exists a uniquek for which this condition holds. Then, the decoder outputs the identified user asŵ =k. Otherwise, if none or more than one user index satisfy the condition, an identification failure is declared (we may assume that the decoder outputs a dummy symbolŵ = 1). Suppose that such uniqueŵ is found. Then, the decoder outputs alsoŝ to be the s-index of one of the codeword pairs
satisfying the typicality condition. If there exist more than one such indices s, one is chosen at random. Finally, the decoder comparesŝ with s(ŵ), and declares the identified user as successfully authenticated ifŝ = s(ŵ).
, S ) be the codewords chosen by the encoder for each k ∈ W (n) in the enrollment phase, and (M 1 ,M 2 ) be the corresponding index vectors of the bins stored in the database. We note that by symmetry of the codebook generation, the analysis of identification/authentication error does not depend on which user w ∈ W (n) is presented to the system. For given w, the relevant identification/authentication error events are given at the bottom of the page.
By the Law of Large Numbers,
with high probability. Thus, P(E 0 ) → 0 as n → ∞. Let M , S, and S be the index sets of m, s, and s , specified earlier in the codebook generation. From the packing lemma [23] 
where K = 2 n(R I −δ) . These conditions are satisfied by the code construction.
Note that here we have shown that the ensemble average probability of identification/authentication error P w ((Ŵ ,Ŝ) = (w, S(w)) for an arbitrary chosen user w can be made as small as desired for sufficiently large n. This is equivalent to say that the ensemble average of the average user identification/authentication error probability
(w, S(w)) vanishes as n → ∞. Using the standard random coding argument [24] we conclude that there exist sequences of deterministic codes of increasing block length with vanishing average user identification/authentication error probability. Finally, using the standard expurgation argument [24] with respect to the user index w, we can easily show that there exist sequences of deterministic codes of increasing block length with vanishing maximal identification/authentication error probability max w∈W (n) P w ((Ŵ ,Ŝ) = (w, S(w))) with the same asymptotic identification rate R I . Before proceeding with the analysis of information leakage rate, we give a lemma which provides a bound on the n-letter conditional entropy based on properties of jointly typical sequences. 
Proof: The proof is given in Appendix A.
a) Information leakage analysis:
For any w ∈ W (n) , the information leakage averaged over all randomly chosen codebook C n can be bounded as follows.
where (a) follows since given the codebook and the joint probability measure P w defined in (1) - (2), 
b) Key rate analysis: For any w ∈ W (n) , we consider the following bound on the secret key rate.
where (a) follows since given the codebook, ] and since probability of a specific pair (u n , v n ) being selected in the enrollment can be bounded by
, where the last inequality follows from
properties of jointly typical sequences. Therefore, the key rate constraint is satisfied if
c) Key leakage analysis: For any w ∈ W (n) , the key leakage averaged over all possible codebooks can be bounded as follows.
where (a) follows since given the codebook, S (w) ), and from the Fano's inequality H w (S (w)|S(w), J (w), M 2 (w), Z n ) ≤ n n which holds because from the codebook generation, the number of possible codewords V n for a given (J (w), M 2 (w), S(w)) is less than 2 nI (V ;Z |U ) and therefore with high probability V n (and thus S (w)) can be decoded given (S(w), J (w), M 2 (w), U n , Z n ), (c) follows from bounding the term H w (U n , V n , Z n ) using properties of jointly typical sequences, i.e.,
where the equality holds since Z − X − (U, V ), from the codebook generation, and from Lemma 1, and finally (d) follows from the codebook generation where
Given (13), combining (9) to (12) and invoking, as already mentioned, the random coding argument, the achievability proof is completed.
B. Converse
We prove converse for the identification rate, compression rate, leakage rate, and key rate averaged over the user set. For convenience, we define a random variable W uniformly distributed over the user set W (n) = [1 : K ]. Therefore the multiletter joint probability model defined in Section II-A is modified as
where all distributions have been already defined in Section II-A and P W is uniform over W (n) . For given n and a given (|M (n) |, |W (n) |, |S (n) |, n)-identification/authentication code C n given as in Definition 1, the average (over the users) identification/authentication error probability is given by
the average (over the users) information leakage rate is given by
the average (over the users) secret key leakage rate is given by
and the average (over the users) secret key rate is given by
Using these quantities in lieu of the corresponding maximum or minimum over w ∈ W (n) quantities in (3a), (3d), (3e), and (3f), respectively, the achievability criterion of Definition 2 is relaxed. Therefore, a converse for this laxer achievability criterion yields an outer-bound to the achievability region of the original problem. Since eventually the converse outer-bound region matches the achievability region proved in Section III-A, the proof of the theorem is complete.
Let us define
. . , n. This follows form the fact that U i is included in V i and (Y i , Z i ) is independent of V i given X i (W ) due to the memoryless property of the "channel" P Y,Z |X . Moreover, we have that H (U i |V i ) = 0.
We assume that there exists a sequence of codes {C n } with identification rate R I , compression rate R C , average information leakage rate R L , and average secret key rate R S , such that the average identification/authentication error probability and the average secret key leakage rate vanish as n → ∞. With respect to such sequence of codes, Fano's inequality implies that H (W, S(W )|M, Y n ) ≤ n n for some n ↓ 0.
For the identification rate we have:
where (a) follows from Fano's inequality
follows from the fact that W is independent ofM, (c) holds due to the fact that
which can be derived from the joint distribution in (14) , and (d) follows from the definition of U i . Next, noticing that n R C ≥ H (M(W )), we can write
where (a) follows from (19) 
) which can be derived from the joint distribution in (14) , and (c) holds due to the fact that the joint distribution in (14) 
Continuing the chain of inequalities, we get
, Z n |Y n ) which follows from the joint distribution in (14) , and (e) follows from the definition of V i . By assumption, the sequence of codes C n achieves (average) information leakage
where (a) holds due to the fact that H (X n (W )|W ) = H (X n (W )) which follows from the joint distribution in (14),
c) holds due to the fact that the joint distribution in (14) implies that 
Continuing the chain of inequalities, we have
where (e) holds since conditioned on W = w, we have the Markov chain
due to the memoryless properties of the "channel"
follows from the Csiszár's sum identity [27] which in this case is 
Lastly, the secret key rate can be bounded as
where (a) follows from the key leakage constraint, (b) follows from Fano's inequality, (c) holds due to the facts that
which the latter can be derived from the joint distribution in (14), (d) follows from the Csiszár's sum identity, and (e) follows from the definitions of U i and V i . The proof ends with the standard steps for single letterization using a time-sharing random variable and letting δ n , n → 0 as n → ∞. The cardinality bounds on the sets U and V can be proved using the support lemma [27] .
IV. CONCLUSION
We studied problems of secret key-based identification and authentication under a privacy constraint on the enrolled source data. An adversary is assumed to have access to the stored database of helper data and the "online" side information correlated with the user's data. We considered the case where the adversary is passive and characterized the optimal tradeoff region of the identification rate, compression rate, leakage rate, and secret key rate for discrete memoryless sources. Also, we considered a variant of the problem where the adversary is active in the sense that it tries to deceive the identification/authentication using its own data. In this problem, we provided the optimal tradeoff region of the identification rate, compression rate, leakage rate, and mFAP exponent. Both results are derived based on the same achievability scheme involving layered random binning and rate allocation technique applied on the first layer codeword. They shed light on whether it makes sense to design a secret key-based identification/authentication system such that the secret key rate is maximized, as the secret key here is not for encryption but only for authentication purpose. It turns out that the maximum secret key rate in our main problem is equivalent to the maximum achievable mFAP exponent in the active adversary case, revealing a close connection between security of identification/authentication systems and the secret key rate.
We also note that the the scenario at hands immediately addresses the cases where the adversary can observe a sequence of other users' measurements or where all the other users k = w collude with the adversary in order to leak information about the users w accessing the system. It turns out that since the users' source sequences {X n (k)} are mutually statistically independent, even in the case of full collusion, when the sequences {X n (k) : k = w} are revealed to the adversary, the optimal achievable region found in this paper does not change. This is because, for any w ∈ [1 : K ], the leakage terms satisfy
In practice, if the same user repeatedly accesses the system, the adversary may eventually learn a significant amount of information since some limited amount of privacy leakage rate is allowed by the system. This case could be avoided for example by having the users re-enroll after certain period of time/number of accesses, analogously to changing passwords regularly in the passwordbased authentication. Notice that since users are encoded separately, the re-enrollment of a user does not require the re-enrollment of all users, i.e., re-enrollment can be performed individually and asynchronously by each user.
Lastly, we note that in this work, the identification part is based on complete decoding such that any individual who attempts to get access to the system will be identified as one of the users in the set [1 : K ]. Security is then guaranteed by the authentication process. As an alternative approach, deferred to future work, it is possible to allow the identification output set to contain an erasure symbol for intrusion detection. In this case, we expect to find a tradeoff between the erasure probability and the identification error probability.
APPENDIX A PROOF OF LEMMA 1 Let T be a binary random variable taking value 0 if (U n (J (w)), Z n ) ∈ T (n) , and 1 otherwise. From the assumption we have that P w (T = 1) ≤ δ . It then follows that
≤ H w (Z n |U n , T = 0) + nδ log |Z| + h(δ ) 
where (a) follows from the bound on R C and (b) follows since Z = e with probability (1 − p)q + p, otherwise Z = X, and lastly Converse: Let (R C , R L , R S ) be an achievable tuple. We now prove that there exist α ∈ [0, 1/2] satisfying the inequalities shown in the achievability above. From the region specified in Remark 3-i), we have the following bound on the compression rate R C . 
APPENDIX C ACTIVE ADVERSARY CASE
The problem formulation involving enrollment and identification/authentication phases follow similarly as that in Section II-A except that now the adversary who observes M and Z n can deceive the authentication using its own sequence to gain access to the system. The formal definition for the code, achievability, and the identification-compressionleakage-mFAP exponent region are given in the following.
Definition 3: An (|M (n) |, |W (n) |, n)-code for secure identification and authentication with a privacy constraint consists of a stochastic encoder, a decoder g
(n)
Id , and a decoder g Id (M,ỹ n ))) ≤ 2 −n(E−δ) .
The identification-compression-leakage-mFAP exponent region R act is defined as the closure of all achievable tuples. ♦ The proof of Theorem 2 is given below with the emphasis on the mFAP exponent where the main idea follows similarly as that in [10] . The proof of identification rate, compression rate, and information leakage rate remains the same as in the proof of Theorem 1.
Achievability: We use the same achievable scheme as in the proof of Theorem 1. For an achievable mFAP exponent, we consider the adversary who observesm = (m 1 ,m 2 ) and side information z n . Let g Id (·) and g Au (·) denote the decoding functions for identification and secret key estimation in the achievable scheme. The adversary tries to select a sequencẽ y n (m, z n ) that results in the estimated key g Au (m,ỹ n ) equal to the original key of the user it is identified to be, i.e., S(g Id (m,ỹ n ) ).
In the achievable scheme, the secret key is chosen as the sub-bin index of the selected codeword v n . Thus, the adversary only needs to consider the secret key that results from codewords v n which are jointly typical with x n . There are in total 2 n(I (X ;U,V )+2δ ) such codewords generated. From the binning scheme with uniform bin and sub-bin index assignment, we have that the joint probability that a description m of certain user k ∈ [1 : K ] is selected and a certain secret key of that user s(k) is chosen is equal to a total number of jointly typical codewords v n with corresponding indices m(k) = (m 1 (k), m 2 (k)) and s(k) divided by a total number of jointly typical codewords v n . That is, 
